ink, pencil, paper
"I would simply ask why so many critics, so many writers, so many philosophers take such satisfaction in professing that the experience of a work of art is ineffable, that it escapes by definition all rational understanding; why are they so eager to concede without a struggle the defeat of knowledge; and where does their irrepressible need to belittle rational understanding come from, this rage to affirm the irreducibility of the work of art, or, to use a more suitable word, its transcendence.”
The tendency for certain agents within fields such as the arts and academia to abstract practices as ideas for contemplation rather than problems to be solved. It can leads researchers to take up research problems principally because they are academically interesting, not ‘real’ social problems.”
“Intellectual life, like all other social spaces, is a home to nationalism and imperialism, and intellectuals, like everyone else, constantly peddle prejudices, stereotypes, received ideas, and hastily simplistic representations which are fueled by the chance happenings of everyday life, like misunderstandings, general incomprehension, and wounded pride.”
“Practice has a logic which is not that of the logician. This has to be acknowledged in order to avoid asking of it more logic than it can give, thereby condemning oneself either to wring incoherences out of it or to thrust a forced coherence upon it. Analysis of the various but highly interdependent aspects of what might be called the theorization effect (forced synchronization of the successive, fictitious totalization, neutralization of functions, substitution of the system of products for the system of principles of production, etc.) brings out, in negative form, certain properties of the logic of practice which by definition escape theoretical apprehension.
"The speaker who can 'take the liberty' of standing outside rules fit only for pedants or grammarians -- who, not surprisingly, are disinclined to write these games with the rules into their codifications of the linguistic game -- puts himself forward as a maker of higher rules..."
"He and his companions wrote many long letters which were kept; in them, they gave accounts of their labours, but none of those written in his lifetime made any mention of miraculous powers. Joseph Acosta, the Jesuit who was so
much troubled by Peru's animals, expressly denied that these missionaries had been helped by miracles in their efforts to convert the pagans. But, soon after Xavier's death, stories of miracles started to abound. It was said that he had the gift of tongues, even though his letters were full of allusions to the difficulties he had to master the Japanese language or find good interpreters. Stories were told of how, when his friends had felt thirsty at sea, he had changed salt water into fresh. When he dropped his crucifix into the sea, a crab brought it back to him. According to a later version, he had thrown the crucifix into the sea to still a tempest. When he was canonised in 1622, it was
proved, to the satisfaction of the Vatican authorities, that he had accomplished miracles, as no one can become a saint without them. The pope gave his official guarantee to the gift of tongues and was particularly
impressed by the fact that Xavier had made the lamps burn with holy water
instead of oil. This same pope, Urban VIII, refused to believe Galileo's statements."
Bertrand Russell www.spirituallysmart.com/Paris…
"...that the one says Yes and the other No. And, in all those cases, each of the opposing opinions is probable. This makes Diana say on a certain subject, Part 3, to. 4, r. 244. " Ponce and Sanchez take opposite views, but, as they were both learned, each makes his opinion probable." ' ' Then, father,' said I, ' one must be very much at a loss how to choose.' ' Not at all,' said he, ' you have only to follow the opinion which you like best.' ' But what if the other is more probable ?' 'No matter,' said he. ' And if the other is more safe ? ' ' No matter/ again said the father, ' here it is well explained by Emmanuel Sa of our company in his Aphorism De dubio, p. 183. We may do what we think lawful ac cording to a probable opinion, although the contrary may be more safe. The opinion of a grave doctor is sufficient' 'And if an opinion is at once both less probable and less safe, will it be lawful to follow it, to the exclusion of that which is believed to be more probable and more safe ?' ' Yes ; once more,' said he, ' listen to Filiutius, the great Jesuit of Rome. Mor. Quest., tr. 21, c. 4. n. 128. It is lawful to follow the less probable opinion though it be the less safe. This is the common opinion of the new authors. Is not that clear ?' ' We have, certainly, large scope, rever end father,' said I, ' thanks to your probable opinions. We have fine liberty of conscience. And you casuists, have you the same liberty in your answers ?' 'Yes,' said he, ' we answer as we please, or rather, as pleases those who consult us. For here are our rules...
' Very good, father, your doctrine is most convenient. Only to answer yes, or no, at pleasure !..."
"When he that speaks, and he to whom he speaks, neither of them understand what is meant, that is metaphysics."